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Abstract Now that the global eradication of wild poliovirus is almost within sight, planning for the post-certification era is
becoming a priority issue. It is agreed that a stockpile of appropriate polio vaccines will need to be established, and a surveillance
and response capacity will need to be maintained, in order to protect the world against any possible future outbreaks attributable
either to the persistence of wild poliovirus or vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs) or to the unintentional or intentional release
of poliovirus from a laboratory or vaccine store. Although it has been suggested that the stockpile should consist of monovalent
oral poliovirus vaccine (mOPV), many questions remain concerning its nature, financing, management, and use — in particular,
because of uncertainties over future national vaccination policies, and over the availability of different vaccines, after the certification
of wild poliovirus eradication. There are further uncertainties concerning the possible role and efficacy of inactivated poliovirus
vaccine (IPV) used either routinely or in outbreak control in low-hygiene settings, the potential for rapid geographical spread of
polioviruses should an outbreak occur after certification, and the risks inherent in introducing additional oral polio vaccine (OPV)
viruses into populations in which the vaccine coverage and prevalence of immunity have declined, and which may thus favour the
spread of VDPVs. Given these important gaps in knowledge, no country should discontinue polio vaccination until a coordinated
policy for the post-certification era has been developed and the recommended measures have been put in place.
Keywords Poliomyelitis/prevention and control; Poliovirus vaccine, Inactivated/supply and distribution; Immunization/trends;
Poliovirus/isolation and purification/pathogenicity; Certification/standards; Carrier state; Disease outbreaks/prevention and control;
Immunization programs/trends; Containment of biohazards/standards; Laboratory infection/prevention and control; Time factors;
Health policy; World health (source: MeSH, NLM).
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Introduction
When the global eradication of wild poliovirus has been attained, a
prerequisite for its certification is that plans — and materials — be
in place to deal with any future polio outbreaks (1, 2). An initial
report on “Stopping a polio outbreak in the post-eradication
era” was presented in 1999 and published in 2001 (3). The present
paper provides an update of that report, emphasizing recent
developments, and calls attention to issues that require con-
sideration for detailed policy formulation in the future.
Sources and risks of poliovirus outbreaks
after certification
Polio outbreaks following certification might be caused by ei-
ther wild or vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV), they could
originate from various sources, and they could occur anywhere.
Several recent events have shown the variety of potential sources
and attest to the reality of these risks.
Wild polioviruses in production facilities
Although it has been hoped that inactivated poliovirus vac-
cine (IPV) production will be possible from Sabin virus stocks,
rather than from wild viruses, as is currently the case, it is still
unclear whether this will be feasible (4). This implies that IPV
production might remain dependent on wild-type viruses,
despite the continued risk of escape as has been shown from
IPV production facilities in the past (5). To reduce this risk, it is
expected that after global certification all manufacturers of IPV
will have implemented biosafety level (BSL)-3/polio contain-
ment requirements.
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Escape from laboratories
A major effort is now under way to make an inventory of wild
polioviruses held in laboratories, and to ensure that these viruses
are either destroyed or held in proper conditions (6). This is a
difficult challenge. Several recent events illustrate the variety of
the risks involved and the difficulty in preventing them entirely.
• Type 2 poliovirus was thought to have been removed from
human populations in 1999. However, in late 2002 and
early 2003, seven cases attributable to MEF-1, a strain of
poliovirus type 2 used in many laboratories, were detected in
India (7). The source of this virus is still unclear.
• Wild poliovirus has been found in laboratory samples not
related to or labelled as polio — for example, in stool specimens
collected from children with diarrhoea (8) and from rhinovirus
reference materials (9, 10).
• The recent do novo synthesis of a poliovirus in a laboratory
(11), and the deliberate release of anthrax as a terrorist weapon
in late 2001, have heightened general fears of the possible
deliberate release of polio, despite the fact that it is acknowl-
edged to be a poor bioterrorist weapon (3).
Vaccine-derived polioviruses
VDPVs could pose a problem after certification, because of the
continued use of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) in some
countries, because of the continued circulation of virus after
cessation of vaccination, or because of its reintroduction from
stored vaccine or from laboratories.
The possibility that Sabin vaccine strains might prove suf-
ficiently transmissible to persist in populations with low vaccine
coverage, and that they might revert genetically towards wild-
type transmissibility and virulence, was merely an hypothesis
until 1999 (12), but it has been shown to be a reality in at least
four outbreaks (13–16). It is clear that persistent transmission of
VDPVs can and does occur, that these viruses undergo constant
genetic change during circulation (presumably towards wild-
type transmissibility), and that they are particularly likely to appear
under circumstances in which hygiene standards are poor and
vaccine coverage is low (17). The full temporal, population, and
geographical extent of VDPV transmission in the four recognized
episodes has yet to be defined, and this is an important issue for
study. These “outbreaks” of VDPVs were controlled by massive
application of OPV in supplementary immunization activities.
Shifting vaccination policy
A crucial factor influencing predictions of outbreak risks in the
post-certification era, and plans for outbreak control, is the pat-
tern of vaccine policies, and levels of coverage, that will be in
place at certification and thereafter. Views on this issue have
changed appreciably in recent years.
It is likely that most countries will continue with routine
polio vaccination at least until certification and that the majority
of countries will continue to use OPV. It is also likely that an
increasing number of high-income and perhaps some middle-
income countries will have shifted to using IPV, or IPV–OPV
combinations, by that time. Such shifts are being driven largely
by concerns to avoid the risk (albeit very low, approximately
two to four cases per million birth cohort per year (18)) of vac-
cine-associated paralytic poliomyelitis (VAPP). In addition, it
now appears that several high-income countries will continue to
use IPV vaccines routinely after certification of the end of wild
poliovirus transmission.
It is far less clear what the rest of the world (the middle-
income and low-income countries) will do after certification.
In theory, each will have the choice of continuing with OPV,
shifting to IPV, or discontinuing polio vaccination altogether.
As long as OPV continues to be used, anywhere in the world,
there will be a continued risk of the introduction of virulent
VDPVs into other populations.
Shifting views on IPV
Although the global eradication initiative emphasized OPV as
its major weapon against wild poliovirus, there is increasing
appreciation that IPV has an important place in current and
future polio control.
The role of IPV in developing country settings —
immunogenicity
It is clear from the experience of those Western countries that
have used IPV for decades that IPV is able to deter wild polio-
virus and OPV circulation in settings with high standards of
hygiene, but there is no evidence for such deterrence in crowded
conditions with poor standards of hygiene. Recent studies of IPV
in the Gambia, Oman, and Thailand found that seroconversion
was inversely related to levels of maternally derived antibody,
and that an early vaccination schedule (i.e. doses at 6, 10, 14
weeks) may lead to suboptimal seroconversion. Protection against
infection or transmissibility was not assessed in these trials (19).
The issue is complicated further by the fact that the levels of
IPV vaccination (in terms of coverage and numbers of doses,
which would be required to prevent virus circulation) will be
contingent on previous vaccination history in the population
and on any waning of immunity that may occur in the absence
of circulating wild poliovirus or VDPV. The accumulation of
evidence on this subject poses a major research challenge, and is
of high priority.
The role of IPV in developing country settings —
availability and coverage
Fundamental to assessing the role of IPV in the future are issues
concerning the availability of IPV within combination vaccines
that might be used in developing countries. There is a trend
towards the use of such vaccines in the wealthier nations, but
these vaccines remain prohibitively expensive for poorer nations
today, unless provided through external assistance. The potential
availability of IPV was recently assessed, and it was concluded
that, given adequate lead time (5–7 years), sufficient quantities
of IPV could be produced to cover the needs of all the world’s
children (20). However, routine coverage levels are currently too
low in many countries to allow a confident shift to IPV vaccines.
On the more positive side, there are major efforts to raise routine
vaccination coverage levels throughout the world, and the Glo-
bal Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) has set a
goal of 90% coverage for each country by the year 2010 (21).
It is in the interest of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative
(GPEI) to be in the forefront of the effort to achieve high
routine coverage in all countries.
Shifting views on the polio vaccine stockpile
There has been general agreement for some years that vaccina-
tion cannot be stopped, and recommendations for stopping
vaccination cannot be made, without first establishing a stock-
pile of vaccine for emergency use should it be needed (1, 2).
49Bulletin of the World Health Organization | January 2004, 82 (1)
Special Theme – Polio Eradication: End-Stage Challenges
Paul E.M. Fine et al                                                                                                                            Polio control after certification
This stockpile would be required to control any outbreaks that
might occur, in order to prevent the re-establishment of virulent
polioviruses. It is now appreciated that a stockpile would be appro-
priate after certification, even if nations continue to vaccinate.
A stockpile of at least 500 million doses of monovalent
OPV (mOPV) of each of the three poliovirus types was first
proposed in 2001 (3). Oral vaccines have for several decades been
considered the vaccines of choice for outbreak control because
of their ease of administration, their relatively rapid induction
of immunity and their superiority over IPV in inducing mu-
cosal immunity. The mOPV was recommended as it would allow
rapid type-specific response, and avoid seeding additional virus
types into the population.
The numbers of doses that would be appropriate for a
global stockpile have recently been revised, taking into account
experience with the circulating VDPV (cVDPV) episodes to
date (numbers of doses employed in campaign responses to these
outbreaks) and including a factor to compensate for a decline in
the proportion immune over time after certification and cessation
of massive polio vaccination initiatives. This approach has led to
predictions of increasing stockpile demand over time in the fu-
ture, rising to 850 million doses of each mOPV type by 5 years
after certification (H. Everts, WHO unpublished analysis, 2003).
This stockpile would be for global use, and “owned” and
controlled by WHO. It has been recommended that at least two
manufacturers should continuously produce the vaccines, so
that the world production capacity would be maintained (3).
There are important outstanding issues concerning the size, vac-
cine type, location, and management of the polio vaccine stockpile.
Although monovalent vaccine is, in principle, simple to manu-
facture (monovalent stocks are produced en route to standard
trivalent vaccines), no monovalent vaccines are currently licenced,
and thus these products raise major regulatory issues that have
yet to be resolved.
Post-certification outbreak control
A variety of post-certification outbreak scenarios might arise,
depending on the following factors:
• the immunity profile of the affected population and sur-
rounding areas and nations, and of the world. This is itself a
function of current and past vaccination policies — for
example, age-specific coverage over the time since certifica-
tion and of any waning of immunity that might occur;
• the type of virus involved — that is, single or multiple types,
wild, vaccine-derived, or “reverted” vaccine-derived virus
(whose phenotype may resemble wild virus);
• the interval between “introduction” of virus and outbreak
recognition;
• the geographical extent of transmission by the time of ascer-
tainment and thereafter;
• the nature of the populations concerned (in particular,  hygiene
status, public health infrastructure, socioeconomic level, and
population density and movement).
The issue of ascertainment is crucial in that only a very small
minority of infections will be evident clinically: perhaps 1 in
200 wild virus infections, 1–2 per million Sabin vaccine virus
infections, and some intermediate proportion of VDPV infec-
tions will cause paralytic disease which might be suspected as
attributable to polio. The likelihood that any individual case
will be suspected as polio will be a function of the index of
suspicion of the health care personnel involved — a suspicion
that is certain to wane in the years after certification. There will
be delays before virological confirmation of any case, allowing
further time for virus to spread. Table 1 shows the delays from
the detection of cases of imported wild poliovirus, or the first
case of cVDPV, to the initiation of mass vaccination campaigns.
Even in recent years, with polio control a very high priority, it
has been difficult to detect, confirm, and institute control mea-
sures in less than 2 months. Therefore, by the time an index case
has been confirmed, it is likely that many thousands of indi-
viduals will have been infected over a large geographical area (3).
Poor hygiene, crowding, low prevalence of immunity, and popula-
tion mobility will all favour rapid spread. These concerns indicate
that high priority should be given to maintaining surveillance
and diagnostic capability on a global basis, including continued
support for the laboratory network facilities required to identify
and to type polioviruses.
If there are one or more cases of poliomyelitis attributable
to wild poliovirus or VDPV after certification, management
decisions will need to be swift, and it should be assumed that
the population involved is far larger than that demonstrably
affected at the time. Efforts may be made to restrict travel beyond
the actually or potentially affected area, although this would in
fact be difficult to enforce (22). The traditional control measures
of isolation, contact tracing and follow-up, quarantine, and travel
restrictions, so successful in controlling severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS) (23), would be inappropriate for polio because
most infections remain subclinical.
Responsibility for managing the outbreak will rest with
national authorities, assisted by experienced groups, who preserve
the wisdom of recent years of the polio eradication initiative,
perhaps coordinated by the Global Alert and Response Unit of
WHO (24). The preservation of this expertise, and the insur-
ance of adequate continued surveillance and response capability,
will be important elements of this planning.
According to current thinking, control of any outbreak will
depend on mOPV vaccine. However, such an approach raises
major problems in itself, being tantamount to “fighting fire with
fire”, as the use of such vaccines would introduce additional live
viruses into the population, which may themselves be trans-
mitted and be subject to selective pressures to revert towards wild-
type transmissibility and virulence. If the population involved is
“closed”, it should be possible to raise coverage to extremely high
levels and thereby to drive out whatever wild poliovirus or
VDPV was responsible for the outbreak, as has been demonstrated
repeatedly in the global programme in recent years. The issue of
removing the introduced mOPV and any derived VDPVs will
arise, but we will at least have the experience of the final stages of
the global programme on which to base policy (e.g. reliance on
OPV campaigns or introduction of IPV).
Most populations, however, are not discrete or “closed”, and
a major problem with outbreaks in the post-certification era will
be that of geographical extent; this differentiates them from out-
breaks over recent years during the GPEI. The very high polio
vaccine coverage in virtually all populations of the world, during
the past decade, has restricted the spread of the last remaining
wild viruses and the known VDPVs.
Geographical spread will be a major problem for the man-
agement of any outbreak in an unvaccinated or undervaccinated
population. At present we lack a credible outbreak control
approach that does not carry an appreciable risk of reintroducing
OPV viruses and vaccination into much — if not all — of the
world, or at least to all countries which have not switched to
routine IPV with high coverage.
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Cautionary perspective
The GPEI was predicated on an assumption that all vaccination
could stop, once wild poliovirus circulation had ceased. This
expectation was, in turn, based on an assumption that the
transmissibility of OPV viruses was limited, and that these viruses
would not persist long after the cessation of OPV vaccination.
There was little formal discussion of this assumption in the early
years of the initiative, and these views have had to be revised in
recent years, as a result of analyses of transmissibility data, and
observations of extensive transmission and genetic “reversion” of
VDPVs. It now appears plausible that OPV-derived viruses will
not disappear from the world on cessation of OPV vaccination
in poor hygiene settings. Whether they might so disappear if
such populations were to shift to IPV has not been demonstrated,
but is a possibility that needs to be explored.
There has also been little consideration of the extent to
which mucosal immunity to polioviruses may wane with time,
after cessation of vaccination. Waning protection has been a
notable issue for other vaccine-preventable diseases (e.g. vari-
cella-zoster and pertussis) and might also prove important for
polio (25).
Consideration of these risks, and of the difficulties of
combating an outbreak of either wild virus or VDPV in a
population that has discontinued vaccination, raises questions
as to the wisdom of stopping polio vaccination in any large
population. It is our view that decisions to cease polio
vaccination altogether should not now be made, by any
country, until evidence is available that this would not entail
exposing the population to a serious risk of  VDPV which
would revert within months to wild-type transmissibility and
virulence.
At least as long as some countries of the world continue to
use OPV vaccines, there will be a continued risk of VDPV
introduction in areas with relatively low vaccine coverage or in
populations objecting to vaccination. The appearance of clusters
of cases attributable to such viruses will require intervention
similar to what has been mounted against the recent outbreaks
in Hispaniola, Madagascar, and the Philippines, (13–15).
Even if the entire world were to shift to IPV, there would
still be a need for contingency planning on how to respond to an
outbreak of wild virus or VDPV, e.g. in a population whose IPV
coverage was low. Whether such a response should best be based
on increasing IPV coverage, or on OPV campaigns, is not clear.
This prospect adds to the urgency of gathering information on
the extent to which IPV is able to deter wild or VDPV transmis-
sion in conditions of poor hygiene.
Finally, there must be recognition of the financial impli-
cations of whatever stockpile and emergency response plans are
deemed appropriate on epidemiological grounds. The costs of the
several options have yet to be estimated, but assurance of political
and financial support for preparedness and for implementation
of polio outbreak control in the post-certification era are major
component challenges of the polio endgame.
Summary and conclusions
Planning for polio outbreak control in the post-certification era
is difficult for many reasons. These include, in particular, the
absence of experience of discontinuing OPV in poor-hygiene
environments, the absence of information on the ability of IPV
Table 1. Paralysis onset, date of reporting, and institution of mass vaccination campaigns following imported cases of wild
poliovirus or AFPa cases with cVDPVb, 1999–2003
Country Year Serotype Date of Date Date of mass Interval from
paralysis onset reported vaccination campaign paralysis to mass
vaccination
Imported
China 1999  Wild PV1c 11 Oct 99 15 Dec 99 21 Jan 00 102 days
Syrian Arab Republic 1999 Wild PV1 26 Nov 99 29 Nov 99 4 Mar 00 98 daysd
Myanmar 2000 Wild PV1 17 Jan 00 17 Jan 00 21 Feb 00 35 daysd
Cape Verde 2000 Wild PV1 16 Aug 00 16 Aug 00 16 Oct 00 61 days
Islamic Republic of Iran 2000 Wild PV1 4 Sep 00 23 Sep 00 29 Dec 00 116 days
Nepal 2000 Wild PV1 14 Nov 00 14 Nov 00 9 Dec 00 25 daysd
Bulgaria 2001 Wild PV1 24 Mar 01 24 Mar 01 28 May 01 65 days
Georgia 2001 Wild PV1 2 Sep 01 3 Oct 01 25 Feb 01 ~6 months
Algeria 2001 Wild PV1 13 Oct 01 April 02 29 Jun 02 ~6 months
Zambia 2001 Wild PV1 11 Dec 01 19 Dec 01 11 Mar 02 82 days
Burkina Faso 2002 Wild PV1 17 Sep 02 19 Sep 02 5 Oct 02 16 daysd
Ghana 2003 Wild PV1 2 Feb 03 6 Feb 03 6 Jun 03 124 days
Lebanon 2003 Wild PV1 23 Jan 03 23 Jan 03 5 Jun 03 133 days
AFP
Dominican Republic 2000 cVDPV1 12 Jul 00 24 Jul 00 Dec 00 ~5 months
Haiti 2000 cVDPV1 30 Aug 00 30 Aug 00 Feb 01 ~6 months
Philippines 2001 cVDPV1 15 Mar 01 27 Mar 01 2–8 Feb 02 ~11 months
Madagascar 2002 cVDPV2 20 Mar 02 28 Mar 02 25 Sep 02 189 days
a AFP = acute flaccid paralysis.
b cVDPV = circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus.
c PV1 = poliovirus type 1.
d Mass campaign already planned before virus was detected
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to deter transmission of different types of poliovirus in popula-
tions living under conditions of high population density and
poor sanitation, and the absence of reliable predictions of the
vaccines and vaccination policies likely to be used in different
countries of the world in the future. The issue of vaccine avail-
ability will be crucial, and it is important that this be determined
more by public health needs than by the economics of the vac-
cine manufacturing industry.
Given the observed ability of VDPVs to persist and to
revert towards the transmissibility and virulence characteristics
of wild-type polioviruses; the absence of convincing evidence
that such viruses will disappear in developing country settings
after cessation of OPV vaccination, even if IPV vaccines are
introduced and delivered at high coverage; and the difficulty of
Résumé
Lutte contre la poliomyélite après la certification : principales questions en suspens
Avec l’éradication mondiale du poliovirus sauvage pratiquement
à portée de la main, planifier la période qui va suivre la certification
devient une priorité. On s’accorde à reconnaître qu’il faudra
constituer des réserves suffisantes de vaccins et maintenir des
moyens de surveillance et de riposte pour protéger le monde
contre de futures flambées dues soit à la persistance de virus
sauvages ou de virus dérivés de souches vaccinales, soit à la
libération accidentelle ou délibérée de poliovirus à partir d’un
laboratoire ou un entrepôt de vaccins. Bien que l’on ait proposé
de constituer des réserves de vaccin antipoliomyélitique buccal
monovalent (VPOm), de nombreuses questions restent en suspens
sur la nature, le financement, la gestion et l’utilisation de ce
vaccin, notamment en raison des incertitudes concernant les
futures politiques de vaccination nationales et de la disponibilité
de différents vaccins après la certification de l’éradication du
virus sauvage. D’autres points d’interrogation demeurent : rôle
éventuel et efficacité du vaccin antipoliomyélitique inactivé utilisé
soit systématiquement, soit pour lutter contre les flambées dans
un environnement où l’hygiène est insuffisante ; risque de
propagation géographique rapide des poliovirus en cas de flambée
après la certification ; risques liés à l’introduction de nouveaux
virus venant du VPO dans des populations où la couverture
vaccinale et la prévalence de l’immunité ont baissé, ce qui pourrait
alors favoriser la propagation des virus dérivés de souches
vaccinales. Compte tenu de tous ces points d’interrogation, aucun
pays ne devrait interrompre la vaccination antipoliomyélitique
avant d’avoir établi une politique coordonnée post-certification
et appliqué toutes les recommandations.
Resumen
Control de la poliomielitis tras la certificación: principales cuestiones pendientes
Ante la aparente inminencia de la erradicación mundial del
poliovirus salvaje, la planificación de la era poscertificación está
convirtiéndose en una cuestión prioritaria.  Es algo admitido que
habrá que acumular vacuna antipoliomielítica y que será necesario
mantener la capacidad de vigilancia y respuesta, a fin de proteger
al mundo contra cualquier brote que pudiera declararse en el
futuro como consecuencia ya sea de la persistencia de poliovirus
salvajes o de origen vacunal, ya de la liberación, intencional o
no, del poliovirus de un laboratorio o de depósitos de la vacuna.
Aunque se ha señalado que las reservas deberían ser de la vacuna
antipoliomielítica oral monovalente (mOPV), subsisten muchos
interrogantes en lo que atañe a su naturaleza, financiamiento,
manejo y uso, sobre todo por la incertidumbre existente respecto
a las futuras políticas nacionales de vacunación y la disponibilidad
de las diferentes vacunas una vez certificada la erradicación del
virus salvaje.  Hay además otras incertidumbres relacionadas con
lo siguiente:  la posible función y eficacia de la vacuna inactivada
usada ya sea sistemáticamente o contra brotes en entornos
insalubres, el riesgo de propagación geográfica rápida de los
poliovirus en caso de declararse un brote después de la
certificación, y los riesgos inherentes a la introducción de virus
OPV adicionales en poblaciones cuya cobertura de vacunación y
prevalencia de inmunidad hayan disminuido, lo que favorecería la
propagación del virus vacunal.  Habida cuenta de esas importantes
lagunas en nuestros conocimientos, ningún país debería
interrumpir la vacunación antipoliomielítica mientras no se haya
formulado una política coordinada para la era poscertificación y
no se hayan puesto en práctica las medidas recomendadas.
rapidly ascertaining and containing an outbreak of wild virus or
VDPV in the post-certification era, it is not yet evident that it
will be safe for any nation to cease polio vaccination altogether,
even after certification of the eradication of wild-type virus.
Even if all countries do continue with routine polio vacci-
nation in the post-certification era, there will still be a need for
outbreak response capability in the event of the (re)appearance
of wild-type virus or cVDPV, to ensure that the achievement of
the global programme in ridding the world of virulent poliovi-
ruses is maintained. Detailed planning for such a response, and
assurance of political and economic support for its implementa-
tion, are high priorities for the global programme.  O
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